William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 4

Article 1

2000

The Silencing of the Minnesota Environmental
Policy Act: The Minnesota Court of Appeals and
the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review
Stacy Lynn Bettison

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Bettison, Stacy Lynn (2000) "The Silencing of the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act: The Minnesota Court of Appeals and the
Need for Meaningful Judicial Review," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 26: Iss. 4, Article 1.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Bettison: The Silencing of the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act: The Minn

THE SILENCING OF THE MINNESOTA
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: THE MINNESOTA
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE NEED FOR
MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW
Stacy Lynn Bettisont
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 968
II. MEPA, EQB REGULATIONS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT .................................................................... 972

A. EIS and EAW Preparation.............................................
B. JudicialReview of Agency Actions ...................................
1. Standard of Review Generally in Agency Actions ..........
2. Scope ofJudicial Review Under MEPA ........................
3. Scope ofJudicialReview Under NEPA ........................

973
976
978
981
984

III. ABDICATING THEJUDICIAL FUNCTION: THE MINNESOTA
COURT OF APPEALS ....................................

Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron
Range Resources .......................................................
B. National Audubon Society v. Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency .........................................................
IV. TWO DISTINCT INQUIRIES: PROCEDURAL AND

985

A.

986
990

995
The Minnesota AdministrativeProcedureAct Governs the
Standard of Review in MEPA Cases ................................ 996
B. The ProceduralComponents of MEPA Require a Separate
ProceduralReview ........................................................
999
C. Applying the "UnlawfulProcedure"Standard in MEPA
Cases ........................................................................
10 00
D. The Effect of SeparateProceduralReview ........................ 1001
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW .............................................................

A.

V . C O NCLUSION ........................................................................ 1006

t
Law Clerk to the Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1999-2000; B.A. 1995, Emerson College; J.D. 1999,
University of Minnesota. This article presents my personal view only. Rachel L.
Toker, James Poradek, Jim Chen and Charles N. Nauen have my gratitude for
their helpful comments and encouragement. I also thank Stephen P. Safranski for
his editorial feedback and his unwavering support.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

1

William
Mitchell LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. 26,LAW
Iss. 4 [2000],
Art. 1
WILLIAM
REVIEW

[Vol. 26:4

I. INTRODUCTION

There was once was a town in the heart of America where
all life seemed to live in harmony with it surroundings.
The town lay in the midst of... prosperous farms, with
fields of grain and hillsides of orchards....
[F] oxes
barked in the hills and deer silently crossed the fields ...
countless birds came to feed on berries....
The
countryside was, in fact, famous for the abundance and
variety of its bird life.... Then a strange blight crept over
the area and everything began to change. Some evil spell
had settled on the community: mysterious maladies swept
the flocks of chickens; the cattle and sheep sickened and
died. Everywhere was a shadow of death.... There was a
strange stillness. The birds, for example-where had they
gone?
Many people spoke of them, puzzled and
disturbed. The feeding stations in the backyards were
deserted....
No witchcraft, no enemy action had
silenced the rebirth of new life in this stricken world. The
people had done it themselves.1
And so wrote Rachel Carson in her landmark book, Silent
Spring. Published in 1962, Carson's dire prophecy of human
impact on the environment hastened the nation into addressing
the perilous effects of toxic chemicals, most notably the insecticide
DDT.2 Along with other important events-the 1969 oil spill in the
Santa Barbara channel, the federal government's plan to dam the
Colorado River and flood part of the Grand Canyon, the scientific
proof that automobile exhaust causes urban smog-Carson's book
spurred the growing environmental movement, leading to new laws
affecting air, water and land.' Environmental disasters and a new
1. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 1-3 (1962).
2. See id. Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane (DDT) was one of the most
widely used chemicals to control insects on agricultural crops and insects that
carry diseases such as malaria and typhus. See Environmental Health Center, A
Division of the National Safety Council (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.nsc.org/ehc/ew/chems/ddt.htm>. DDT had devastating effects on bird populations
because birds preyed on the insects exposed to DDT. The effect of DDT in birds
was that they laid thin-shelled eggs that would break during incubation. See
Environmental Defense Fund, 25 Years After DDT Ban, Bald Eagles, Osprey Numbers
Soar (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/newsreleases/1997/jne/e ddt.html>.
The EPA canceled most DDT use under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in 1972. See id.
3. See PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 3 (2d ed. 1996). Congress passed numerous environmental protection laws
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articulation of preservationist ideals combined to create a national
recognition of human impact on the natural environment.
This emerging national awareness produced the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a one of America's first
significant environmental laws. The purpose of NEPA is to
"declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; and to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
",5
environment ....
This national legislation was recognized as
being the "broadest and perhaps the most important" of the many
6
environmental statutes passed in the early 1970s. It requires that
the federal government "use all practicable means and measures"
to "foster and promote" environmental values so that "man and
nature can exist in productive harmony. 7 NEPA mandates that
government agencies follow certain procedures to assess adverse
environmental impacts that major projects or actions of the federal
government might cause."
in the early 1970s, including: Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (creating a
framework for regulating air pollution); Federal Water Pollution Act (Clean Water
Act), enacted in 1972 (imposing limits on discharges of pollutants into water and
establishing a national permit program for certain discharges); Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972 (establishing federal pesticide
regulation); Endangered Species Act, passed in 1973 (prohibiting action that
imperils species at risk of extinction); Safe Drinking Water Act, passed in 1974
(requiring federal government to set limits on safe levels of contaminants in
drinking water); Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976 (granting power to federal
agency to regulate and prohibit harmful chemical substances); and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (granting power to agency to regulate
management of hazardous wastes).
For a comprehensive outline on the
significant environmental laws, see id. at 106-08.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
5. Id. § 4321.
6. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a).
8. See id. § 4332(2) (C). The first cases construing NEPA concluded that, in
addition to providing a procedural component, Congress intended to create
substantive obligations on the government to protect environmental values. See
Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1112 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §4331(a)); see also
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972)
(stating that Congress intended to require federal agencies to give effect to the
environmental goals of NEPA). The Supreme Court later stated that NEPA
imposed only procedural requirements on agencies.
See Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980):
[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural
requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has
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Minnesota is among many states that passed similar legislation
declaring a state policy that would, like NEPA, "encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between human beings and
their environment.. .. "9 Providing a parallel procedural mandate
to NEPA, the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA)
requires state agencies to consider the adverse environmental
impacts of any major state action. 0 If a potential for significant
environmental impact exists, an agency must prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) that describes the action in
detail and analyzes its significant environmental impacts." To
determine whether an EIS is necessary, the agency must first
prepare an environmental assessment worksheet (EAW) . 12
Surprisingly, state agencies prepare few EISs each year because the
agencies almost invariably conclude through the EAW that the
proposed project has no potential for significant environmental
impact. 13
Minnesota courts have been instrumental in defining the
obligations of agencies under MEPA. While the Minnesota
Supreme Court has decided some MEPA issues, many of the
contours of MEPA's present landscape were hewn by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. In recent years, the court of appeals has
considered the specific issue of whether an agency's decision to
forego an EIS because there is no potential for significant
environmental impact (also known as a "negative declaration")
should be upheld. In several cases, the court of appeals deferred
considered the environmental consequences; it cannot "inteject itself
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the
action to be taken."
Id. (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
9. MINN. STAT. § 116D.01 (1997); see FRANK P. GRAD,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

TREATISE

ON

§ 9.08(2) (a-u) (1999) (providing an overview of states that

have passed legislation mirroring NEPA).
10.

See MINN. STAT. § 116D.03 (1998).

11. Seeid. § 116D.03, subd. 2a.
12. Seeid. § 116D.03, subd. l(a)(b).
13. According to an Environmental Quality Board (EQB) staff member, EISs
are uncommon, in part, because agencies often wish to avoid the time and
expense of an EIS and instead attempt to have the EAW approach the content
level of an EIS. Telephone Interview with Jon Larsen, Principal Planner,

Environmental Quality Board (Jan. 26, 2000); see alsoJohn H. Herman & Charles
K. Dayton, Environmental Review: An Unfulfilled Promise, BENCH & B. OF MINN., July,
1990, at 32 (observing that the EIS is usually avoided).

14.

See, e.g., In re American Iron and Supply Co.'s Proposed Metal Shredding

Facility in Minneapolis, Minn., 604 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Pope
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to the agencies' expertise in determining the potential for
significant environmental impact and upheld the agencies'
decisions. 15 In two of those cases, discussed at length herein, the
court of appeals upheld negative declarations even when the
agencies failed to follow MEPA's strict procedures. The court of
appeals did not recognize that the Minnesota Administrative
Procedure Act (MAPA) governs the standard of review in MEPA
cases. By not applying the appropriate standards as articulated in
MAPA, the court failed to make the distinct inquiry of whether the
agency followed proper procedure in making its determination.
Instead the court reviewed the decision against the deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard. Most likely motivated by a desire
not to second-guess agency decisionmaking, the court has twice
declined to enforce the procedural requirements of MEPA.
In doing so, the court has undermined the efficacy of MEPA.
At one time, MEPA was seen as a procedural safeguard to ensure
that agencies thoroughly examined and considered the
environmental impacts of major state actions before they
commenced. An overly deferential Minnesota Court of Appeals,
however, has relegated MEPA from its designated role to the
functional equivalent of a mere policy statement. The intended
potential for MEPA to be a muscular framework for environmental
protection exists partially, if not primarily, in its procedural
mandates, like its federal antecedent NEPA.
Permitting agencies to depart from procedures, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has abandoned the concept ofjudicial review and
overlooked the principles of administrative law that govern it:
courts must defer to agencies on substantive matters that
necessarily require the expertise of the agency; however, courts
should not defer to agencies when determining whether the agency
followed required procedure.
Passed at a time of mounting awareness of and increasing
concern about environmental degradation due to human activity,
County Mothers v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 594 N.W.2d 223 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1999); National Audubon Soc'y v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency,
569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); White v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural
Resources, 567 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Iron Rangers for Responsible
Ridge Action v. Iron Range Resources, 531 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995);
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of Agric., 528 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995).
15. See, e.g, American Iron and Supply, 604 N.W.2d at 150; National Audubon
Soc'y, 569 N.W.2d at 211; White, 567 N.W.2d at 734; Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 874.
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MEPA is intended to ensure that governments make informed
decisions and thus avert the daunting, yet very possible, reality that
humans might one day be the primary cause of the silent spring
envisioned by Rachel Carson.' 6 Yet, without any recognition by the
court of appeals that MEPA creates strict procedural obligations on
agencies, the intended effect of MEPA is lost.
This article will examine the instances in which the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has abdicated its judicial function of determining
when agencies have properly complied with MEPA's procedures.
This article will discuss how the line between deferring to agency
expertise and requiring strict compliance with procedure has
blurred.
NEPA, upon which MEPA is framed, is useful to
understanding the distinction between procedural and substantive
review. Part II will outline the relevant provisions of MEPA and the
regulations directing agency decision-making, and it will discuss the
provisions governing judicial review under MAPA. It will also
outline judicial review of cases arising under NEPA. Part III will
analyze the Minnesota Court of Appeals' approach to reviewing
agencies' decisions regarding the necessity of an EIS and will
highlight the ways in which the court of appeals has collapsed
substantive compliance into the separate and more exacting
procedural requirements of MEPA. Part IV will suggest the proper
legal standards of review under MEPA, specifically the negative
declaration decisions.
It will outline the analysis that the
Minnesota Supreme Court should conduct to ensure that agencies'
substantive decisions receive deference and that nothing less than
strict procedural
compliance
is demanded
of agency
decisionmaking under MEPA.

II. MEPA, EQB

REGULATIONS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT

The EIS is the heart of MEPA. 7 The statute focuses primarily
on the standards for determining when an EIS is necessary and the
information to be included in an EIS. Likewise, the regulations
promulgated by the Environmental Quality Board (EQB), the
agency created to implement MEPA, concentrate on the EIS as the
analytical tool that examines a proposed project's significant
16.

See supra note 1.

17.
18.

SeeMINN. STAT. § 116D.04 (1998).

See id.
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environmental impacts.' 9
A.

EIS and EAWPreparation

MEPA's substantive and procedural requirements are
triggered when "there is potential for significant environmental

.2o
effects resulting from any major governmental action ....
Before such an action may begin, the "responsible governmental
unit" (RGU) 2' shall prepare "a detailed environmental impact
statement. '' 22 An EIS "shall be an analytical rather than an
encyclopedic document which describes the proposed action in
detail, analyzes its significant environmental impacts, discusses
appropriate alternatives to the proposed action and their impacts,
and explores methods by which adverse environmental impacts of
By com-parison, NEPA provides
an action could be mitigated.
that an EIS shall discuss the environmental impact of actions;

adverse environmental effects that are unavoidable; alternatives to
the proposed action; "the relationship between the short-term uses
of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
and irreversible and irretrievable
long-term productivity;"

See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrIY BD., GUIDE TO MINN. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
(1998) [hereinafter GUIDE TO MINN. RULES].
20. Id. At the date of publication, whether a state agency action is "major"
has not been litigated in the Minnesota courts. By comparison, NEPA's parallel
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C), which requires an EIS for any "major Federal
action" has been construed numerous times by various courts. See, e.g., Sierra Club
v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that federal action may be a part
of a larger federal action and still require a separate EIS); Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding state-funded airport
terminal and parking garage projects were not so closely interwoven with those
receiving federal funds as to make the project "federal action"); RESTORE: The
North Woods v. United States Dep't of Agric., 968 F. Supp. 168, 175 (D. Vt. 1997)
(concluding major federal action under NEPA may encompass action by
nonfederal actors if federal agency has authority to influence nonfederal activity).
21. The RGU is the agency, county or other unit of government "with the
greatest authority over the project as a whole." GUIDE TO MINN. RULES, supra note
19.

RULES 1

19, glossary. The issue of whether the designated RGU was the appropriate unit to
conduct environmental review of the proposed project has been litigated only
once in Minnesota. See Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range
Resources, 531 N.W.2d 874, 882-83 (Minn. Ct.App. 1995).
22. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a.
23. Id. The statute also provides that the EIS shall "analyze those economic,
employment and sociological effects that cannot be avoided should the action be
implemented.
To ensure its use in the decisionmaking process, the
environmental impact statement shall be prepared as early as practical in the
formulation of an action." Id.
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4
commitments of resources involved in the project.
The threshold question in determining whether a major
government action requires an EIS is whether that proposed
project has the potential to significantly affect the environment.'
The RGU bases the decision of EIS necessity on the EAW and the
26
comments it receives during the comment period.
The EQB's
regulations enumerate the required contents of an EAW.27 The
EAW and the comments received serve as the basis for one of two
possible conclusions by the RGU: 1) the proposed action has no
potential for significant environmental effects
(negative
declaration); or 2) the proposed action has the potential for
significant environmental effects and the RGU must prepare an EIS

24. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (i)-(v) (1994).
25. Notably, the threshold question of whether an action has the potential to
significantly affect the environment is buried in the middle of MEPA in section
116D.04, titled "Environmental impact statements." See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04,
subd. 2a. It is apparent that the statute focuses on the EIS, rather than the EAW.
26. See id. This initial assessment in the EAW serves also to determine the
proper scope of an EIS, should one be necessary. SeeMINN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 3.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) is the agency responsible
for promulgating rules to carry out NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332, 4342 (1994).
The regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-08 (1999).
27. See MINN. R. 4410.1000. The EAW is a brief form consisting of six pages.
See id. The regulations provide that the EAW shall address at least the following
major categories:
A. identification including project name, project proposer, and project
location;
B. procedural details including identification of the RGU, EAW contact
person, and instructions for interested persons wishing to submit
comments;
C. description of the project, the purpose of the project, methods of
construction, quantification of physical characteristics and impacts,
project site description, and land use and physical features of the
surrounding area;
D. resource protection measures that have been incorporated into the
project design;
E. major issues identifying potential environmental impacts and issues
that may require further investigation before the project is commenced;
F. known governmental approvals, reviews, or financing required,
applied for, or anticipated and the status of any applications made,
including permit conditions that may have been ordered or are being
considered; and
G. if the project will be carried out by a governmental unit, a brief
explanation of the need for the project and an identification of those
who will benefit from the project.
MINN.

R. 4410.1200.
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(positive declaration).28
The regulations recognize that in some instances there will be
insufficient information to adequatel ' determine whether the
potential for significant impact exists.
If the RGU "determines
that information necessary to a reasoned decision about the
potential for, or significance of, one or more possible
environmental impacts is lacking, but could be reasonably
obtained" the RGU must either make a positive declaration or
postpone the decision for thirty days to obtain the missing
information.
The rules also establish the following criteria the
RGU must use to determine the potential for significant
environmental effects: type and extent of impact; cumulative effects
of related or future projects; the role of mitigation; and the extent
to which effects can be controlled by studies undertaken by other
31
agencies or the project proposer.
If the RGU makes
a positive declaration, it must
then prepare
33
32
an EIS.32 Positive declarations are, however, rare. Statistically, EIS
preparation is the exception rather than the rule. The EQB does
not have a formal method for collecting data on the number of
EAWs and EISs prepared each year. Information for 1996 is
available, however, and it indicates that RGUs prepared 137 EAWs
and two EISs.3 It is arguable that simply because there are only two
28.
See MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 3. "An EIS shall be ordered for projects
that have the potential for significant environmental effects." Id. 4410.1700, subp.
1.
29.
See id. 4410.1700, subp. 2(a).
30. Id. 4410.1700, subp. 2(a)(A)-(B).
If the RGU makes a positive
declaration due to insufficient information, it must include "within the scope of
the EIS appropriate studies to obtain the lacking information." Id. 4410.1700,
subp. 2a (B).
31.
See id. 4410.1700, subp. 7 (A)-(D).
32. See id. 4410.1700, subp. 3.
33.
See supra note 13.
34. Telephone Interview with Jon Larsen, Principal Planner, Environmental
Quality Board (Apr. 15, 1999).
The Minnesota Historical Society informally
records the number of EAWs and EISs prepared each year. While that office is
missing some data, its information also reveals few EISs prepared yearly: in 1997,
60 EAWs and zero EISs; in 1998, 99 EAWs and one EIS; and in 1999, 68 EAWs and
one EIS.
Telephone Interview with Sarah Jordan Beimers, Review and
Compliance Associate, State Historic Preservation, Office of the Minnesota
Historical Society (Jan. 31, 2000). On the other hand, an individual from the
Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Review Section, suggested
different numbers, although his data could not be confirmed: 150-200 EAWs each
year compared to 5-10 EISs each year. Telephone Interview with Thomas W.
Balcom, Environmental Planning Director, Minnesota Department of Natural
Resources (Feb. 2, 2000).
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to three EISs completed each year does not mean the statute is not
working, or that the purposes of MEPA are being frustrated. It is
not my intention to argue that environmental review in Minnesota
is ineffective. Rather, I point to these numbers in part because they
are surprising, given the statute and the low threshold of
"potential" to significantly impact the environment. From
my
discussions with various administrators working in environmental
review, the consensus seems to be that the content of EAWs tends
to be more intensive than perhaps the statute intended. 5 RGUs
have every incentive to complete
an overly thorough EAW to avoid
36
the preparation of an EIS.
Not surprisingly, much of MEPA
litigation concerns the RGU's decision
not to prepare the more
7
analytical and comprehensive EIS.3

B. JudicialReview of Agency Actions
The principal issue in cases where a party challenges an
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS is substantially the same in
35. See supra note 13.
36. See supra note 13. Herman and Dayton note that the EQB has recognized
the low numbers of EISs prepared and even stated the following in a 1985 report:
It is difficult to reconcile [the EAW purpose] with the reality that an EAW
almost never leads to an EIS. It seems that either most projects being
screened through the EAW process do not merit consideration for an EIS
or that the EAW process is being used in practice to substitute for an
EIS.... If the latter is true, then the role of the EAW process should be
reevaluated.
See Herman & Dayton, supra note 13, at 33 (citing 1985 EQB report). Herman and
Dayton argue that the EAW as a decisionmaking tool is ineffective, especially in
light of the low threshold of the need for an EIS: "The EAW's purpose is simply to
say whether such potential effects 'might' or 'possibly' could occur and whether
further review is needed." Id. at 36. "In a state of 4 million, it is inconceivable that
there are fewer than ten projects, permits and funding decisions warranting full
scale environmental review." Id. at 37. They also argue that when the EIS is
avoided by the supposedly more comprehensive EAW, a meaningful and more
advanced review of cumulative effects and alternatives to the proposed project is
lost. See id. at 33, 37.
Herman and Dayton also note that the Minnesota Supreme Court has
failed to use the "searching 'strict procedural compliance' standard adopted in
other states and the federal cases." Id. at 36. They state that "[1]egal precedents
have not engendered strong implementation [of MEPA], because of a limited
number of cases and the Court's failure to utilize those limited cases as a vehicle
for strong direction." Id. at 37.
37. See, e.g., In reAmerican Iron and Supply Co.'s Proposed Metal Shredding
Facility in Minneapolis, Minn., 604 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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both federal and state cases: whether the agency was required
under the provisions and regulations of the statute to prepare an
EIS. 38 The difference between the federal and state cases, however,
is the standard of review used to evaluate the agency's decision.39
Since the Supreme
Court recognized
NEPA as imposing only
•
•
40
procedural requirements on agencies, courts primarily review an
agency's compliance with the procedures of NEPA.
Innately
procedural, NEPA does not dictate particular substantive results.
Rather, it ensures informed decisionmaking by government
43
bodies. If the agency complies with the procedures, presumably a
well informed and reasoned decision follows. 44 As such, federal
courts set aside agency action if procedures are disregarded;
however, substantive review is limited and agencies have a wide
latitude of discretion.45
Unlike courts construing NEPA, Minnesota courts have not yet
circumscribed MEPA to contemplate a procedural element only.
Minnesota courts, I argue, must review both the agency's
compliance with procedure and its substantive decision.
The
following section will outline the standards of review used in agency
action in general and in environmental review cases, both state and
federal.

38.

See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 225

(1980).
39. See infra notes 51, 64-68 and 69-73.
40. See supra note 8 (discussing Strycker's Bay and the Supreme Court's
declaration that NEPA is a procedural statute).
41. See Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 225.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. It is to insure a fully informed
and well-considered opinion .. " Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
45. See Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 225 ("NEPA was designed 'to insure a fully
informed and well-considered decision,' but not necessarily 'a decision the judges
of the Court of Appeals or of this court would have reached had they been
members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency.'") (citing Vermont Yankee, 435
U.S. at 558).
46. This article does not examine what substantive obligations MEPA imposes
on acts. Other "Little NEPAs" or SEPAs (state environmental protection agencies)
might require certain substantive results, such as requiring agencies to avoid the
detrimental environmental impacts addressed in the EIS or EAW.
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Standardof Review Generally in Agency Actions

MEPA provides that "[a] ny aggrieved party may seek judicial
review vursuant to chapter 14. , Minnesota Statute chapter 14 is
MAPA.
Like the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
MAPA provides a process for agency rulemaking, adjudications,
and other decisionmaking, and entails the procedural rights for
those challenging agency action.4 9 Also, like the federal APA,
MAPA articulates the scope ofjudicial review of agency action. 50
The standards ofjudicial review in the federal APA and MAPA
are essentially identical. Both statutes provide that agency actions
may be set aside if such actions 1) violate a constitutional right or
provision; 2) exceed the agency's statutory powers or jurisdiction;
3) are made in contravention of procedure; 4) are contrary to law;
5) are unsupported by substantial evidence or 5) are arbitrary or
capricious.
Minnesota case authority holds that an agency's decision is
upheld unless it "reflects an error of law, the determinations are
arbitrary and capricious, or the findings are unsupported by the
47.

48.

MINN. STAT.
MINN. STAT.

§ 116D.04, subd. 9 (1998).
§§ 14.001-.69 (1998).

49. See id. §§ 14.13-.20, 14.44-.45, 14.57-.62.
50. See id. §§ 14.57-68.
51. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (1994); MINN. STAT. § 14.69. Specifically, the
federal APA provides that agency action may be set aside if that action is:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title [adjudications] ....

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2). By comparison, MAPA provides that agency action may be
reversed or modified if it is:
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as
submitted; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious.
MINN. STAT. §

14.69.
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evidence."" The party seeking review of the agency's action has the
burden of proving that the agency's decision meets one or more of
the listed criteria in MAPA.
In Minnesota, a reviewing court affords "substantial judicial
deference" to the fact-finding processes of the agency. 54 In
addition, a court will not reverse an agency determination if there
are various approaches to a matter or even if the court would have
concluded differently had it been the fact-finder.5 5 It will find that
an agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious, however, if the56
decision "represents [the agency's] will and not its judgment.,
The court reviews the administrative record and determines
whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency's
decision. In addition, courts defer to an agency's interpretation
58
of its own rules or regulations and the statute that it administers.
Minnesota courts review de novo, however, an agency's
interpretation of a statute. 59 Finally, courts do not defer to an
52. In re Northern State Power Co. for Approval of its 1998 Resource Plan,
604 N.W.2d 386, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Glazier v. Independent Sch.
Dist. No. 876, 558 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)).
53. See Info Tel Communications, L.L.C. v. Minnesota Pub. Util. Comm'n,
592 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
54. See id. at 884.
55. See In re American Iron and Supply Co.'s Proposed Metal Shredding
Facility in Minneapolis, Minn., 604 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing
White v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural Resources, 567 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997)).
56. Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of Agric., 528 N.W.2d 903, 907
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Mammenga v. Department of Human Servs., 442
N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. 1989)).
57. See Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Ranger Resources,
531 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); cf Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) ("Review under the substantial-evidence test is
authorized only when agency action is taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of
the [APA] itself,.. . or when the agency action is based on a public adjudicatory
hearing.") (internal citations omitted).
58. See, e.g., American Iron and Supply, 604 N.W.2d at 144-45; In re Q
Petroleum, 498 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); St. Otto's Home v.
Minnesota Dep't of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1989).
59. See American Iron and Supply, 604 N.W.2d at 144; see also No Power Line,
Inc. v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 320 (Minn. 1977)
(stating that when reviewing questions of law, courts need not defer to agency
expertise). Courts do defer to an agency interpretation of a statute that the
agency administers if the interpretation is not in conflict with the statute's purpose
and the intent of the legislature. See Geo. A. Hormel & Co. v. Asper, 428 N.W.2d
47, 50 (Minn. 1988) ("[A]n agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers is
entitled to deference and should be upheld, absent a finding that it is in conflict
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agency's decision to sidestep procedures, and will reverse an agency
determination if procedure has been disregarded.6
By comparison, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
the United States Supreme Court articulated the various standards
under the federal APA.
In Overton Park, the Secretary of
Transportation authorized expending federal funds for the
construction of a six-lane interstate highway going through a public
62
park in Memphis, Tennessee.
Citizens and environmental
coalitions challenged the action on various grounds, including that
63
the Secretary failed to follow statutory procedures.
Before the Court could review the Secretary's actions, it64
noted that it first must decide which standard of review to apply.
The Court explained that there were "six separate standards" in the
federal APA. The Court first considered the federal legislation
66
that governed the Secretary's actions and analyzed the obligations
of the Secretary by considering that which was left to agency
discretion, those procedures that the agency must follow, and areas
where there was no law governing certain actions. 67
After
with the express purpose of the Act and the intention of the legislature."); cf.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
84243 (1984) (stating that if "Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question" and the "intent of Congress is clear," the court and the agency "must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress;" if Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question, the court determines "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute").
60. See, e.g., Hiawatha Aviation of Rochester, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of
Health, 375 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing agency decision
because it was based upon unlawful procedure); Northern Messenger, Inc. v.
Airport Couriers, Inc., 359 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (reversing and
remanding agency decision when it failed to follow proper procedure); see also
MINN. STAT. § 14.69 (c) (1998); cf City of Moorhead v. Minnesota Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 343 N.W.2d 843, 849-50 (Minn. 1984) (determining that the agency
used proper procedure in rendering its decision).
61. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977).
62. See id. at 406-07.
63. See id. at 408-09.
64. See id. at 413.
65. Id. at 413 n.30.
66. The statutes at issue were the Department of Transportation Act and the
Federal-Aid Highway Act, both of which provided that the Secretary of
Transportation could not approve any "program or project that requires the use of
public parkland unless (1) there is not feasible and prudent alternative to the use
of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize
" Id. at 411 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 138; 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f)
harm to such park ....
(1964)).
67. See id. at 414-17.
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considering the agency's duties, the Court concluded that three
separate standards of review applied: whether the Secretary acted
within the scope of his authority; whether the choice made was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; and whether the
Secretary's
actions
followed
the
necessary
procedural
requirements. 6'
Clear from Overton Parkis the threshold necessity of examining
the statute to determine what obligations it imposes, what
regulations apply, how much discretion the agency possesses, and
what procedures an agency must follow. Only after an inquiry into
the agency's duties can a court determine which standard of review
it must use to evaluate the agency's actions. 69
Different statutes impose different duties on the agency and,
as such, varying standards of review will apply. In Overton Park, the
Court found that Congress had "specified only a small range of
choices that the Secretary" could make.7" Therefore, the Court
considered whether the Secretary "acted within the scope of his
statutory authority.""1 In addition, the Court determined it must
also review the substantive nature of the decision under the
arbitrary and capricious standard."
Lastly, because the statute
imposed certain procedural requirements on the Secretary when
determining if a highway project could proceed, the Court
considered whether the Secretary's actions followed the necessary
procedures.13 Overton Parkteaches that the standard of review turns
on what obligations and duties the statute creates.
2.

Scope ofJudicialReview underMEPA

When reviewing negative declarations, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals has stated that it reviews the agency's decision for whether
it was "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious."74 Curiously, the
court of appeals has never, in the environmental review setting,
68. See id. at 415-17.
69. If, for instance, a statute provides no procedural obligations, then
obviously it is unnecessary to determine whether the agency decision was made
without observance of procedure.
70. Id. at 416.
71. Id.

72. See id.
73. Seeid. at417.
74. See Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Resources,
531 N.W.2d 874, 879 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v.
City of Minneapolis, 502 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1993)).
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relied on MAPA, despite MEPA's declaration that MAPA governs
judicial review. 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court relied on MAPA
in Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst,76 when it considered whether the
decisions of two state agencies denying permits for disposal sites for
taconite tailings was well founded." The court did make clear that
MAPA governed
the standards
of review
of agency
decisionmaking. 7' The deferential standard of "unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious" in environmental review cases traces back
to a 1988 Minnesota Supreme Court case reviewing a city council's
zoning decision. 79 Historically, zoning decisions are reviewed
75. Other Minnesota cases reviewing agency actions cite to and apply MAPA.
See, e.g.,
Nevels v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 590 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999) (citing MINN. STAT. § 14.69(d), (e) (1998) to review Department of
Human Services decision); Bastian v Carlton County Highway Dep't, 555 N.W.2d
312, 317-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing MINN. STAT. § 14.69 (d), (e) to review
Department of Labor determination); Central Tel. Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 356 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing MINN. STAT. § 14.69
(d), (f) to review Public Utilities Commission action); Northern Messenger, Inc. v.
Airport Couriers, Inc., 359 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Minn.
Stat. § 14.69(c) to review Minnesota Transportation Regulation Board decision).
76. 256 N.W.2d 808, 823 (Minn. 1977).
77. See id. at 828.
78. See id.
79. See Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of Agric., 528 N.W.2d 903,
907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). (Technically, the first review of an agency's negative
declaration occurred in Minnesota Pub. Interest Group v. Minnesota
Environmental Quality Council, 237 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1975). In that case the
court declared that the agency had a "rational basis" for not requiring an EIS and
thus the agency's decision was not arbitrary or capricious. See id. at 382. Although
the Minnesota Supreme Court was the first court to set the standard of review in
negative declaration cases, I do not use this case in my analysis here because the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has not relied on it in its negative declaration cases,
but has instead relied on the line of cases that follow).
In determining the standard of review, the Trout Unlimited court stated
"We review the Commissioner's decision [negative declaration] to determine
whether it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." Id. (citing Carl Bolander, 502
N.W.2d at 207).
In Carl Bolander, the plaintiff sought a license from the City of
Minneapolis to operate a recycling facility inMinneapolis. See Carl Bolander, 502
N.W.2d at 205. Bolander applied to the city for the license, but the city council
determined that before it would issue a license to operate, an EAW must be
prepared pursuant to MEPA to assess the potential for environmental harm. See
id. at 206. The issue before the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether the city
council's decision denying Bolander a license on the basis that an EAW was
necessary was "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." See id. at 207 (citing
Swanson v. City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 1988)). While the
issues in Carl Bolander concerned MEPA and EAWs, the more narrow issue dealt
with the city council's determination not to issue Bolander a license for his
recycling facility. While MEPA issues were present, the primary issue concerned a
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under a highly deferential standard, as compared to the five
standards outlined in MAPA. s°
A Minnesota court reviewing a negative declaration typically
begins by stating that judicial review is limited to determining
whether the agency's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious.8 ' To determine whether an agency decision is arbitrary
or capricious, the court determines whether the RGU's decision
was based on substantial evidence in the record . Stated another
way, the review focuses on "the legal sufficiency of and the factual
basis for the reasons given. 83 An agency's decision will also be
municipality's refusal to grant a license. See id. at 205-06.
The Carl Bolander court appropriately relied on Swanson, 421 N.W.2d at
313, for determining the proper standard to review the city council's actions.
Swanson also concerned a zoning matter and the Swanson court relied on White
Bear Docking and Storage, Inc. v. City of White Bear Lake, 324 N.W.2d 174 (Minn.
1982). See Swanson, 421 N.W.2d at 311. The White Bear court noted that "[t]he
court's authority to interfere in the management of municipal affairs is, and
should be, limited and sparingly invoked." Id. The White Bear court considered
whether the City Council of White Bear Lake acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying an application for an amended special use permit to install a 10-foot by
50-foot mobile trailer office on the shore of White Bear Lake. See White Bear, 324
N.W.2d at 175.
Minnesota Statute sections 462.351-.365 govern the procedures for
municipal planning. Specifically, section 462.361 provides for judicial review of
any governing body's decision. The municipal planning chapter does not refer to
Chapter 14,MAPA, as does MEPA in its provision concerning judicial review.
80. Court decisions articulating a standard of review in zoning planning cases
under Minnesota Statute sections 462.351-.365 review a city council's decision
under a "rational basis" or a "reasonableness" standard. See Hoon v. City of Coon
Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Minn. 1981) ("[T]he standard of review is the
same for all zoning matters, namely, whether the zoning authority's action was
reasonable. Our cases express this standard in various ways: Is there a 'reasonable
basis' for the decision? or is the decision 'unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious?'
or is the decision 'reasonably debatable'?"); Campion v. County of Wright, 347
N.W.2d 289, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984):
The setting aside of routine municipal decisions should be reserved for
those rare instances in which the City's decision has no rational basis.
Except in such cases it is the duty of the judiciary to exercise restraint and
accord appropriate deference to civil authorities in the performance of
their duties.
Id.
81. See Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Resources,
531 N.W.2d 874, 879 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Carl Bolander,502 N.W.2d at
207).
82. See id. at 880 (citing Swanson, 421 N.W.2d at 313 (reviewing zoning
decision of municipal authorities pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 462.361).
83. National Audubon Soc'y v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 569
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found arbitrary or capricious if the agency relied on factors that the
legislature did not intend, if it completely failed to consider an
important part of the problem, if it offers an explanation that goes
against the evidence, or "if the decision is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed
to a difference in view or the product of
,,.84
agency expertise.
3.

Scope ofJudicialReview under NEPA

Federal courts considering NEPA issues articulate an
altogether different standard of review. Federal courts consider
whether the agency's decision was "without observance of the
procedure required by law. 8 5

Courts recognize that NEPA is

essentially a procedural statute, and thus agency action taken
without observance of procedure will be set aside under section
706(2) (D) of the APA. 8 Courts note that the rigorous procedures
of NEPA rec uire a "strict standard of compliance" on the part of
the agency. NEPA requires "full, fair, bona fide compliance,"8 8
because the policies of NEPA are only effectuated when the
"prescribed procedures are faithfully followed; grudging, pro forma
compliance will not do." 9
While courts reviewing actions under NEPA generally limit
N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Swanson, 421 N.W.2d at 313).
84. Trout Unlimited, 528 N.W.2d at 907.
85. See, e.g., Save the Yaak Comm'n v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir.
1988). When an agency has decided to go forward with a federal action after it has
prepared and considered an EIS, the court determines if the necessary procedures
were followed, considers questions of law de novo, and examines the facts to
determine whether the agency's decision to commence the project is arbitrary and
capricious. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 41021 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
86. See supra note 51 (outlining section 706(2) of the Administrative
Procedure Act).
87. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In articulating the procedural
requirements of NEPA, Judge Skelly Wright noted that NEPA's sponsor, Senator
Jackson, characterized the procedures of NEPA as "action-forcing" and observed
that Jackson stated that without the full compliance with the procedures, "these
lofty declarations [in Section 101] are nothing more than that." Id. at 1112-13.
Judge Wright also stated that "a purely mechanical compliance with the particular
measures in § 102(2) (C) & (D) will not satisfy the Act if they do not amount to full
good faith consideration of the environment." See id. at 1112-13 n.5 (emphasis
omitted).
88. Kilroy v. Ruckelshaus, 738 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc)).
89. Lathan, 506 F.2d at 693 (emphasis omitted).
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review to procedural compliance, that analysis does at times
depend in part on certain substantive matters. 90 Consequently,
federal courts do in fact engage in a very limited review of
substantive decisions. Courts note that NEPA does not dictate
particular substantive results, 9' but that the policy behind NEPA is
one that seeks "to ensure that an agency has at its disposal all
relevant information about environmental impacts of a project
before the agency embarks on the project."92 Consistent with this
statement, courts defer to an agency's substantive decision and use
the standard of review employed by Minnesota courts-whether the
agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious.9 It is important to
note, however, that whether the agency's substantive decision is
arbitrary or capricious is a distinct inquiry from whether the agency
action is without observance of applicable procedure.
The
Minnesota Court of Appeals has failed to recognize this distinction,
and the resulting holdings are erroneous.
III. ABDICATING THEJUDICIAL ]FUNCTION: THE MINNESOTA COURT
OF APPEALS

In reviewing an agency's negative declaration, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has extended the concept of deference beyond
the province of agency expertise, and the court has unduly
deferred when considering whether agency action is based upon
unlawful procedure. Two cases of recent vintage, Iron Rangers for
Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Resource] 4 and National

Audubon Society v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency9 ' illustrate how
the court of appeals has failed to distinguish the substantive and
procedural components of MEPA.

90. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
91. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989).
Compare this requirement with MEPA. MEPA has never been declared to be only
a procedural statute.
92. Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1994).
93. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 375-76.
94. 531 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
95. 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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Iron Rangers For Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range
Resources

Originally serving as a local ski area with "the first downhill run
cut out of the mountain forest in the mid 1950s," today Giants
Ridge Ski Resort is one of the Midwest's "finest resort-style golf
courses" with year-round activities." In 1995, the Iron Range
Resource and Rehabilitation Board (IRRRB), a quasi-state agency,
sought to create what is now a highly rated resort area in
Minnesota's northern woods.
The IRRRB sponsored the
development of a golf course and housing facilities in the Giants
Ridge area. 9s Before the project could commence, MEPA required
the preparation of an EAW.99 St. Louis County served as the RGU
and determined that an EIS would be unnecessary as there was no
potential for significant environmental effects.100
Two environmental groups, the Minnesota Center for
Environmental Advocacy (MCEA) and Iron Rangers for
Responsible Ridge Action (the Rangers), sued the IRRRB and St.
Louis County to prohibit the issuance of conditional use permits
(CUPs) and the project construction permits before the agency
prepared an EIS.
MCEA and the Rangers argued, among other
things, that the county erred in determining that there was no
potential for significant environmental effect because "the project
would affect ground and surface water, could harm the barren
strawberry, the clustered bur reed, or the floating marsh marigold,
and would cause forest fragmentation. " 'O2 The district court
granted the IRRRB's and the county's cross-motion for summary
judgment.0 3
96. Giants Ridge Golf & Ski Resort (visited Apr. 24, 2000) <http://testl.duluth.com/resort.html>.
97. See Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 878.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100.
Seeid. at 877.
101.
See id. at 879.
102. Id. In support of prohibiting the issuance of the CUPs and other permits,
the plaintiffs also argued that St. Louis County was not the appropriate RGU and
could not assume responsibility for environmental review under the statute and
the rules. See id. at 882. The court rejected the argument and held that St. Louis
County could serve as the RGU. See id. at 883.
103. See id. at 879. The county argued in favor of its cross-motion for summary
judgment that the project had no potential for significant effects and thus the
county's negative declaration was not arbitrary or capricious. See id.
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On appeal, the court considered whether the county's decision
that a proposed 18-hole golf course, upgrade of ski trails, 04 and
possible future construction of 200 to 250 housing units would not
cause significant environmental effects was arbitrary or
capricious.,0 5 The court began its analysis by declaring it would
review the county's negative declaration using the arbitrary or
capricious standard. 1 6 The court also outlined the relevant
provisions of MEPA and the EAW regulations, and in turn
evaluated each of the plaintiffs' complaints.
Beginning with forest fragmentation, the court noted that the
Department of Natural Resources' (DNR) comments suggested
that such fragmentation could disrupt habitat for various species of
birds, but also noted that there was "no data showing there is a
population of migratory songbirds in northern Minnesota that
would be affected."' 7 The court stated that while the DNR was
"collecting statewide data on forest fragmentation to develop a
forest policy" the county could not be "compelled to prepare an
EIS on the basis of speculative factors" because "MEPA does not
provide absolute guarantees for environmental resources."' The

104. The resort has 60 kilometers of cross-country ski trails, cleared to 20 feet
wide with a groomed surface of 18 feet. See Giants Ridge Golf & Ski Resort (visited
Apr. 24, 2000) <http://testl.duluth.com/cc-ski.html>.
105. See Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 878-79.
106. See id. at 879; supranote 79 and accompanying text.
107. Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 881.
108. Id.
When the court stated that an EIS could not be prepared on
speculative factors, it cited Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 829-30
(Minn. 1977), noting parenthetically that "MEPA does not provide absolute
guarantees for environmental resources." See id.
Apparently the court was citing to the portion of the Reserve Mining
opinion in which that court was considering Minnesota Statute section 116D.04,
subdivision 6, which provides that no "permit for natural resources management
and development [shall be] granted, where such action or permit has caused or is
likely to cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land, or
other natural resources, ...
so long as there is a feasible and prudent
alternative .. " MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 6 (1998).
This subsection is
triggered only when an EIS has already determined that there will be significant
impairment to the environment due to the proposed project. The Reserve Mining
court was considering whether the parties were required to consider the feasibility
and prudence of an alternative site. See Reserve Mining, 256 N.W.2d at 829.
Specifically, the plaintiff in Reserve Mining was concerned about the safety of
certain proposed dams and argued that the statute prevented issuance of a permit
when a project might be unsafe. See id. at 829-30.
The Reserve Mining court noted that no expert for either side had opined
that the dams as designed would be unsafe and concluded that subdivision 6 did
not apply when the safety of a structure was undisputed. See id. at 829. In
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Iron Rangers' court used Reserve Mining's conclusion that MEPA does
not set a standard that guarantees absolute safety from project
siting to support the proposition that MEPA does not provide9
absolute guarantees for natural resources when data is wanting.'0
Because the issues under consideration in each case were distinct
and the applicable statutory provisions were different, Iron Rangers'
use of Reserve Mining's reasoning was irrelevant to the discussion of
whether an the agency properly issued a negative declaration in
light of the insufficient data. In addition, the court used Reserve
Mining as a way out-the court essentially threw up its hands
claiming that MEPA makes no guarantees.
The court also concluded that neither NEPA nor MEPA
mandates that a negative declaration "be based only on the best
available scientific methodology."' 0
The county, the court
reasoned, was in a difficult position where it had to "make a
reasoned analysis of the evidence before it ....

Where there are

technical disputes and uncertainties, the court must assume that1
the agency or RGU has exercised its discretion appropriately."
The barren strawberry was rare and listed as "of special concern"
but not "endangered. ' ,1

2

According to the court, because the

effects of current forest management on the strawberry were
unknown, the rule calling for deference to agency determinations

addition, the court looked to NEPA to interpret MEPA and concluded that
nothing in either statute dictated that project siting guarantees "absolute safety."
See id. at 830. Instead, the statute and regulations only required that the siting for
the dam not pose a "significant threat to public health or safety." Id.
109. See Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 881.
110. Id. Iron Rangers cited Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 135152 (9th Cir. 1992), where that court considered whether the plaintiffs' assertions
that the National Marine Fisheries Service's data supporting a negative declaration
was insufficient or its methodology inadequate. See Greenpeace Action, 982 F.2d at
1351. The court was loathe to require the best scientific data, but instead decided
that "adequate data" would serve as the standard. See id. It concluded that
Greenpeace was merely asserting a "difference of scientific opinion."
Id.
Greenpeace had relied on Wild Sheep, where the court held that the Forest Service
failed to address "certain crucial factors, consideration of which was essential to a
truly informed decision whether or not to prepare an EIS." See id. (quoting
Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172,
1178 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Greenpeace Action panel distinguished Wild Sheep by
stating that in the present case, the Fisheries Service did not completely fail to
consider crucial factors as did the Forest Service in Wild Sheep. See Greenpeace
Action, 982 F.2d at 1352.
111. Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 881 (citing to Coalition on Sensible Transp.,
Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
112. Id.
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when technical uncertainties were present applied, and as such the
court was required to "defer to the discretion of the county."" 3
In short, the court concluded that because there was a lack of
information, the agency need not prepare an EIS. Notwithstanding
the regulations that direct agency action in the event that there is
insufficient
information to make an informed and reasoned
•• 114
analysis, the court equated insufficient information with technical
or disputed information. By likening deficient information to
technically disputed information, the court failed to require the
agency's full compliance with regulations that direct the RGU to
either "make a positive declaration.. . or.. . postpone the decision
for the need for an EIS... in order to obtain the lacking
information." 5
The Iron Rangers court next considered the impact on ground6
and surface water. While the EAW declared a significant impact,"
the county asserted that there were mitigation measures in place." 7
The RGU had asked IRRRB to conduct a second phase assessment
and deferred the issuance of a CUP to provide more time to
identify additional mitigation measures.11 8 The court found that
the possibility of mitigation measures supported the county's
negative declaration." 9 In addition, the court noted that "state law
and local permit controls regulate the use of herbicides and
pesticides, and project compliance with those regulations weighs
heavily in favor of a finding of no significant impact for an EIS."'
113. Id.
114. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (quoting MINN. R. 4410.1200,
subp. 2a, which directs agency action if there is insufficient information).
115. MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 2a (A)-(B).
116. See Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 881 ("The EAW states that the golf course
construction will have an impact on ground and surface water because of the
varied or higher temperature of water runoff and the herbicides used.").
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id. The court cited to Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir.
1991) for the proposition that other laws and regulations would prevent any
significant impact. In Lockhart, the plaintiff was concerned with a land transfer
from the Forest Service to a private owner who wished to build luxury homes on
the land. See id. at 1030-31. The court considered whether there might be
significant impact due to seepage from the sewage systems into an aquifer that
supplied water to Lockhart and her neighbors. See id. at 1033. The court
concluded that while studies indicated that there would be some problems, those
problems might be cured with proper placement of tanks and that because "the
applicable zoning regulations contain stringent requirements for safe sewage
disposal," there would be no significant impact. Id.
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While mitigation is a valid consideration to determine whether
a project has the potential for significant impact, it is only one of
four criteria the agency must analyze. 2 ' In holding that the
agency's decision deserved discretion because one of the four
factors cut in favor of no potential for significant impact, the Iron
Rangers' court did not require compliance with the procedures. In
contravention of the regulations, the court upheld a determination
by the RGU that was based on only one of the criteria. In addition,
permitting the project to proceed on the condition that other
studies may be conducted to determine the impact undermines the
reason 122for review-preventing the adverse impact before it
occurs.

The court deferred to the agency's decision not to follow

the regulations.
B.

National Audubon Society v. Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency

Two years after Iron Rangers, the court of appeals reviewed
another RGU's determination that an EIS was unnecessary. In
National Audubon Society v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, the
court upheld the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency's (MPCA)
decision that a proposed expansion of the Potlatch Corporation
plant near Cook, Minnesota, did not have the potential to
significantly
impact the environment, and thus did not require an
124
EIS.

In 1995, Potlatch Corporation proposed an expansion of one
of its plants and applied to the MPCA for an amendment to its air
121. See MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7 (A)-(D).
122. See Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of Agric., 528 N.W.2d 903,
909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). The Trout Unlimited court was faced with a similar
situation as was presented in Iron Rangers. In Trout Unlimited, the RGU determined
that an irrigation project near a trout stream had no potential for significant
impact and thus an EIS was unnecessary. See id. at 903. The EAW stated that
chemicals found in pesticides could impact the trout stream in several ways, but
the RGU ultimately concluded that "monitoring and permit conditions can
identify significant impacts and modify or terminate the project if necessary." Id.
at 909. The court, unconvinced by the RGU's rationale for not preparing an EIS,
stated, "[t]he very purpose of an EIS, however, is to determine the potential for
significant environmental effects before they occur. By deferring this issue to later
permitting and monitoring decisions, the [RGU] abandoned [its] duty to require
an EIS where there exists a 'potential for significant environmental effects.'" Id.
(citing MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (1998)).
123. 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
124. See id. at 218-19.
125. The MPCA "was established in 1967. Its purpose is to protect Minnesota's
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emission permit. 116 The plant expansion was expected to increase
wood consumption
from 178,000 cords per year to 355,000 cords
127
each year.
It was anticipated that the increase in wood consumption at the plant would clear an estimated 7,600 acres of
mature forest each year. l12 The EAW focused principally on the
impact to air quality and the impact of timber harvesting.129 The
EAW based its discussion of the impact of harvesting on the
findings of a Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) on
Timber Harvesting and Forest Management in Minnesota.13 ' The
GEIS, completed in• -131
1994, studied the cumulative effects of timber
harvesting statewide.

The GEIS addressed the effects of increased timber harvesting
in the state under three situations: "a base level of 4 million cords
per year; a medium level of 4.9 million cords per year; and a high
level of 7 million cords per year.' 12 The increased harvest from the
Potlatch expansion fell just below the medium harvest level that the
GEIS studied."' The MPCA ultimately delegated its responsibility
to determine the impact of timber harvesting to the DNR because
more expertise in forestry and wildlife
the DNR had
134
management. The DNR's Division of Forestry and the Division of
Fish and Wildlife split on whether an EIS was necessary: "the

environment through monitoring environmental quality and enforcing
About MPCA (visited Apr. 7, 2000)
environmental regulations."
<http://www.pca.state.mn.us/about/index.html>.
126. See Audubon, 569 N.W.2d at 214.
127. See id.

128. See id. Potlatch estimated that "90% of the wood for the proposed
expansion will be harvested within the four counties surrounding the Cook facility:
Itasca, Koochiching, Lake, and St. Louis counties." Id.
129. See id.
130. See id. The GElS is discussed generally in the regulations, under the
section concerning EISs. See MINN. R. 4410.3800. The rule determines how the
GElS relates to project-specific review:
Preparation of a generic EIS does not exempt specific activities from
project-specific environmental review. Project-specific environmental
review shall use information in the generic EIS by tiering and shall reflect
the recommendations contained in the generic EIS if the EQB
determines that the generic EIS remains adequate at the time the specific
project is subject to review.
Id. 4410.3800, subp. 8.
131. See Audubon, 569 N.W.2d at 214.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
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Division of Forestry supported the increased timber harvesting and
recommended a finding of no significant impact;" the Division of
Fish and Wildlife "determined that the increased timber harvesting
had the potential for significant environmental effects" and
recommended an EIS."' Ultimately, the Commissioner of the DNR
concurred with the Division of Forestry and recommended a
negative declaration.1 16 After the comment period, the MPCA
found there was no potential for significant impact, and, as such,
determined that an EIS was unnecessary."'
The plaintiffs sued the MPCA, challenging the negative
declaration and seeking an injunction prohibiting the MPCA from
13 8
granting any permits and invalidating any permits already issued.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims and the plaintiffs
appealed.139 One of the issues before the court of appeals was
whether "the MPCA's determination that the Potlatch expansion
did not have the potential for significant environmental effects...
[was] arbitrary and ca9ricious and not based on substantial
evidence in the record."'
Two sub-issues concerned the validity of the negative
declaration. The first was whether the mitigation measures that the
GEIS recommended justified the MPCA's finding that the Potlatch
expansion
did141 not have the potential to significantly affect the
•
environment.
The second issue was whether the MPCA evaded
project-specific review by relying on the GEIS to determine that
there was no potential for significant impact.1

135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id. The MPCA then distributed the EAW for public comment and
received 27 comments from private citizens, environmental groups and other
government agencies. See id.
138. See id. at 215.
139. See id.
140. Id. The plaintiffs also raised two other issues on appeal. The first was
whether the MPCA's negative declaration was arbitrary and capricious because it
did not include various adverse scientific opinions and other agencies' comments
in the administrative record. See id. The court held that because that information
was not part of the administrative record, the RGU was not required to consider
the data in making its decision. See id. at 216-17. The second issue concerned the
district court's ability to review the negative declaration under the Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act (MERA), Minnesota Statute section 116D.03. See id. at
215. The court held that MERA did not provide a cause of action in negative
declaration cases. See id. at 218.
141. Seeid. at 217.
142. See id.
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With respect to the first issue, the plaintiffs argued that the
MPCA's reliance on mitigation measures was "wholly speculative"
and the MPCA had no authority to enforce such mitigation
measures. 43 The mitigation measures were presumably speculative
because the EAW did not address specifically whether the Potlatch
expansion had the potential for significant impact. 44 Rather, as the
court discreetly indicated in a footnote, the GElS did not include
the Potlatch expansion as one of the "possible forest industry
expansions"
but considered other possible expansions in different
145
areas.
The MPCA outlined various mitigation measures
recommended in the GEIS,
including --ones already undertaken
,,146
- by
,
Potlatch and "evaluated the status of those measures.
According
to the EAW, Potlatch was presently implementing some of those
measures and had reduced adverse impacts.'47
The court determined that the mitigation measures were
specific enough and that they would likely be implemented by
Potlatch.
The court reasoned, "while the Potlatch expansion will
have some significant environmental impact, the EAW and the
GEIS provide and target specific
49 mitigation measures to reduce the
impact of any adverse effects.'

Concerning the second issue, the plaintiffs argued that the
MPCA "improperly relied on the GEIS to evade project-specific
review."'

50

The court disagreed, stating:

In this case, it is questionable whether a project-specific
EIS would provide information substantially different
143.
144.
145.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 217 n.1. The footnote reads:

The EAW noted that while the Potlatch expansion was not included in
the list of possible forest industry expansions considered during the
preparation of the GEIS's medium harvest level, several of the
expansions that were being considered at that time are no longer being
considered. The MPCA considered it appropriate to use the GEIS
because the Potlatch expansion replaced those projects no longer being
considered.

Id.
146. Id.
147.

See id.

148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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from or better than that contained in the GELS. The
Environmental Quality Board requested the GElS because
the effects of timber harvesting within the state could not
be adequately analyzed on a case-by-case, project-specific
basis. This is, in part, because it is not possible to identify
the specific areas or stands of timber that will be harvested
and because the ownership of Minnesota's available
timberland is divided among a wide variety of groups and
individuals.' 5'
The court further reasoned that because harvesting depends
on the discretion of the landowner, there was no meaningful way to
identify the specific 7,600 acres of timberland that likely would be
cut in the four-county area.1 2 Because of this, the court 5opined,
3
the RGU did not need to conduct a project-specific review.1
By permitting the RGU to base its determination that the
Potlatch expansion had no potential for significant environmental
impact on the GEIS, the court dismissed entirely MEPA's
requirement that "[w]here there is the potential for significant
environmental effects resulting from any major governmental
action, the action shall be preceded by a detailed environmental impact
statement prepared by the responsible governmental unit.' ' 54 In
Audubon, the court sanctioned an EAW that did not consider any of
the effects peculiar to the Potlatch expansion.
As stated above,
the court acknowledged in a footnote that the GEIS did not
consider the areas that Potlatch wished to harvest but analyzed
other areas of the state.156 Despite the requirement that each
project undergo a project-specific review, the impact of Potlatch's
expansion was never considered in accordance with the regulations
because it was "questionable" whether an EAW or EIS analyzing
effects specific to the four-county region would be useful. The
151. Id. at 217-18. At that time, according to the GEIS, "private individuals and
corporations other than the forest industry owned approximately 43% of
Minnesota timberland; the state owned 21%; counties 17%; the federal
government 12.3%; and the forest industry owned 5% of Minnesota's available
timberland." Id. at 218.
152.
153.
154.

See id.
See id. at 217-18.
MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (1998) (emphasis added); see supra notes

23-24, 27-29 and 31-33 and accompanying text (outlining MEPA's provisions and
the regulations governing EAW preparation).
155.
156.

See Audubon, 569 N.W.2d at 217.
Seeid. at 217 n.1.
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court's deference to the RGU's decision not to prepare a projectspecific EAW or EIS illustrates the court of appeals' deference to an
RGU on the most basic matters of binding procedure.
Not only did the court improperly defer to the RGU, but also it
plainly ignored EQB regulations that specifically address the
relationship that GEISs have to project-specific review. Such
regulations provide that "[p] reparation of a generic EIS does not
exempt specific activities from project-specific environmental
review."1 57 The court apparently concluded that because the RGU
claimed that it was difficult, complicated or even useless to prepare
a project-specific environmental review, the need for projectspecific review was a technical matter that required the court to
show deference to the RGU's expertise. The court wrongly found
that the need for project-specific review was a substantive matter
requiring agency expertise. The rules pertaining to the specificity
of review, are clear-they mandate review for each project, and a
GEIS is not a substitute.
IV. Two DISTINCT INQUIRIES: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE

REVIEW

To rectify the erroneous legal applications and conclusions of
Iron Rangers and Audubon, the Minnesota Supreme Court should
recognize that MEPA requires judicial review of RGU action by at
least two standards. 15 The first standard reviews the agency's
substantive determination using the arbitrary and capricious
standard. 5 9 The second standard considers whether, in making its
determination, the agency followed proper procedures as outlined
by the rules and regulations. In the environmental review context,
this procedural question is perhaps the more critical inquiry
because determining which procedures an agency must follow is
not a matter that depends on technical judgments, scientific
variables or probabilities. Rather, compliance with procedure is a
matter within the court's unique expertise, and the RGU does not
have the discretion to decide which rules apply and when. For
MEPA to serve any useful purpose, this second inquiry must be
157. MINN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 8.
158. This article focuses on the procedural standards of review that the court
has overlooked. It is possible that other standards may be applicable in other
cases, and depending on what the litigants challenge, various provisions of MAPA
might apply.
159. See Audubon, 569 N.W.2d at 215.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

29

William
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol. 26,
Iss. 4 [2000],
Art. 1
WILLIAM
MITCHELL
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 26:4

more exacting, and the agency action is to be set aside if it was the
result of unlawful procedure.6 °
A.

The Minnesota AdministrativeProcedureAct Governs the Standard of
Review in MEPA Cases

To reestablish the "action-forcing" nature of MEPA and to give
full effect to the intent and purpose with which the Minnesota
legislature enacted MEPA, the Minnesota Supreme Court should
affirmatively declare that agency decisions under MEPA are
reviewed pursuant to MAPA. Without such a pronouncement,
Minnesota courts will continue in failing to establish the distinction
between the necessity of deference to an RGU's decisions that
necessitate technical expertise and the requirement that the RGU
strictly follow MEPA's procedures.
The current and incomplete standard of review in negative
declaration
cases "first arose
in Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Minnesota
Departent
161
Department of Agriculture. As the first court to review an RGU's
negative declaration, Trout Unlimited stated that the RGU's
determination was reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious
standard. 16 The court relied on Carl Bolander to determine the
proper scope of judicial review; however, this reliance on and
citation to CarlBolanderwaserroneous.163
As stated above, Carl Bolander concerned a licensing decision
by the Minneapolis City Council. I64 As a historical matter, courts
have reviewed zoning and local licensing determinations for
rationality, typically
in the local zoning authorities a wide
•• bestowing
165
latitude of discretion.
Zoning issues and environmental review,
however, are clearly separate and discrete legal issues. Not only is
zoning often a purely local matter usually handled by a city's
council, but a distinct statute governs it. 66 The statute applying to
zoning decisions refers to the availability of judicial review, but,
160. See supranote 51 and accompanying text (citing Minnesota Statute section
14.69 and the federal APA).
161. 528 N.W.2d 903.
162. See id. at 907.
163. See supranote 79 and accompanying text.
164. See Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 502 N.W.2d 203, 205
(Minn. 1993).
165. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing zoning cases and the
"rational basis" or "reasonableness" standard of review used in such cases).
166. See MINN. STAT. § 462.351-.365 (1998). Section 462.361 provides for
judicial review of zoning decisions.
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unlike MEPA, it does not cross reference MAPA as the statute that
governs judicial review of zoning decisions.16 As such, CarlBolander
and its predecessor cases are not the correct precedent for
establishing the standard of review in MEPA cases because they
concern licensing and zoning decisions.
In addition, it was incorrect to rely on Carl Bolander for the
proper scope of review because MEPA provides its own process for
judicial involvement in the environmental review process. MEPA
specifically states that "[a]ny aggrieved party may seek judicial
review pursuant to chapter 14 [MAPA].'169 The legislature
intended that the many standards of MAPA apply, when
appropriate, to MEPA issues. Citing case law that concerns zoning
and licensing and ignoring the clear legislative directive that MAPA
applies in MEPA cases is legally incorrect. Only three cases arising
under MEPA have correctly relied on MAPA.7
Notably, those
cases have not been negative declarations but have concerned the
7
adequacy and proper timing of EISs and statutory interpretation. '
Unfortunately, as the first court to review an RGU's negative
declaration, Trout Unlimited set a bad precedent in the sense that it
erroneously relied on Carl Bolander for determining the scope of

167. See CarlBolander, 502 N.W.2d at 205.
168. Various policy concerns support a very limited review of zoning decisions.
The first, and most obvious, is a concern that the judiciary might be the least
institutionally competent to review decisions that are based on economic, political
and social factors. City planning decisions are fact-intensive endeavors, involving
numerous contingencies, factors that the judiciary is arguably least suitably
equipped to effectively handle. In addition, there is little need for uniformity for
zoning decisions because the subject matter is often peculiarly local. Lastly,
substantial delay would result if zoning decisions were subject to a scrutinizing
review and would freeze a locale's progress.
169. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 9 (1998).
170. See No Power Line v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312,
320 (Minn. 1977) (citing to MAPA and stating that "reviewing court is not bound
by the decision of the agency and need not defer to agency expertise" on legal,
rather than factual matters); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 82223 (Minn. 1977) (reviewing decision to deny permits for construction of on-land
disposal taconite tailings and quoting MAPA standards of review); In re University
of Minn., 566 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (reviewing issuance of air
emissions permit for a steam plant renovation pursuant to MAPA).
171. See University of Minn., 566 N.W.2d at 104 (considering Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency's interpretation of the pollution standard in Minnesota
statues section 116D.04, subdivision 6); No Power Line, 262 N.W.2d at 325
(analyzing at what point in the project's proceedings the agency must complete
the EIS); Reserve Mining, 256 N.W.2d at 828-31 (considering whether it was
necessary to examine alternatives to the proposed project site).
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judicial review."' This misapplication of the law has contributed to
a blurring of the distinction between procedure and substance in
MEPA cases.
Because MEPA is as much about ensuring informed decisionmaking as it is about "avoid[ing] and minim[izing] damage to
Minnesota's
environmental
resources,"'
the
procedural4
component of MEPA is crucial to its effective implementation.
The procedural components become critical because they are the
process that the RGU uses to disclose information about
environmental effects and ways to minimize them.175 When
procedures are not followed, the result is misinformation or
insufficient data forming the basis for what might be an erroneous
substantive decision on the part of the RGU. In addition, the
public is not informed in the manner MEPA intended and thus
communities are unable to make certain decisions or provide
useful comments about the proposed project.
In light of MEPA's specific reference to MAPA, the Minnesota
Supreme Court should hold that MAPA guides the court's review of
agency action in all MEPA cases. Reliance on inapplicable case law
such as Carl Bolander in the negative-declaration setting only
undermines the efficacy of MEPA and gives the agency discretion
on matters that do not require technical judgments or special

172. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Despite establishing an
incorrect and incomplete standard of review, Trout Unlimited correctly held that
the agency's negative declaration was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to
consider the cumulative effects of future projects as required by Minnesota Rule
4410.1700. See Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of Agric., 528 N.W.2d
903, 908 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). In addition, the court held that relying "on
monitoring or restrictive permitting procedures to reduce or eliminate those
deleterious effects" of the project did not support a negative declaration because
"the very purpose of an EIS... is to determine the potential for significant
environmental effects before they occur. By deferring this issue to later
permitting and monitoring decisions, the Commissioner abandoned his duty to
require an EIS where there exists a potential for significant environmental effects."
Id. at 909. The precedential effect of Trout Unlimited, despite the incorrect
standard of review, is important because the court required compliance with the
rules and noted the important purposes of the EIS, even while evaluating the RGU
action under the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.
173. GUIDE TO MINN. R., supra note 19, at 1; see supra note 92 and
accompanying text (noting that courts have recognized the policy of NEPA to be
one that ensures that an agency "has at its disposal all relevant information about
environmental impacts of a project").
174. See No Power Line, 262 N.W.2d at 323 (stating that the policies of MEPA
can "be advanced through the procedural mechanism of the EIS").
175. See id.
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agency expertise. While agencies enjoy a presumption of sound
decisionmaking and discretion for their substantive decisions,
limiting judicial review for all agency action under MEPA to the
arbitrary and capricious standard gives agencies discretion that
MAPA and MEPA did not contemplate.
B.

The ProceduralComponents of MEPA Require a SeparateProcedural
Review

Once the Minnesota Supreme Court announces the express
applicability of MAPA to MEPA, it should determine which of
MAPA's provisions apply to review agency action under MEPA, and,
specifically in the negative-declaration context. This determination
is made by conducting an Overton Parkanalysis.1' 6
In Overton Park, the United States Supreme Court combed the
statutory provisions of the federal legislation at issue and decided
what procedural and substantive obligations the legislation
imposed on the agency."7 Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court
should look to MEPA and determine the types of obligations that
MEPA creates. Using MEPA's federal antecedent as guidance, the
Court has declared that NEPA creates procedural obligations only;
NEPA does not dictate particular substantive results.
Before the
Court's declaration that NEPA only required adherence to certain
procedure,179 courts regarded NEPA as containing both a
procedural and substantive component.
By comparison, MEPA has not been relegated to a procedural
statute only. While federal courts only review NEPA actions for
procedural compliance, Minnesota courts may review both the
agency's adherence to procedure and its substantive decisions. The
procedural components can be found primarily in the EQB's
regulations governing the EAW and EIS preparation process. 10
The substantive elements of MEPA can be found principally in
MEPA's language directing state government to "use all practicable
means... to create and maintain conditions under which human

176. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
177. See supranotes 61-69 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
179. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976)).
180. See GUIDE To MINN. RULES, supranote 19, at 7-9.
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beings and nature can exist in productive harmony. ... ""' Under
MAPA, therefore, at least two provisions govern the extent of
judicial review: whether the agency action was 2"made upon
unlawful procedure" or was "arbitrary or capricious."1
C. Applying the "Unlawful Procedure"Standard in MEPA Cases
It is crucial that courts apply the "unlawful procedure"
standard correctly. In using this standard, courts should carefully
distinguish between the procedural obligations and substantive
discretion of agencies. In considering MEPA's procedures, courts
should acknowledge that MEPA, like NEPA, requires a "strict
standard of compliance.' ' 8 3 When an RGU engages in the process
of deciding whether a project has the potential for environmental
effects, MEPA requires nothing less than complete, fair, and "bona
fide compliance."184 In both MEPA and its federal equivalent, the
environmental policies are only realized when the "prescribed
procedures are faithfully followed. 18 5 Minnesota courts should
require RGUs to follow dutifully the regulations furthering
Minnesota's environmental policies, and this requires an in-depth
evaluation of the agency's actions.
When determining whether the agency has followed proper
procedure, a substantive evaluation will, at times, become
necessary, and understanding precisely when the substantive
analysis emerges is important. For instance, the EQB's MEPA
regulations provide that the RGU shall consider the "cumulative
potential effects of related or anticipated future projects" when
determining whether the proposed project has the potential for
significant environmental effects.186 The EQB has interpreted this
criterion to mean "that cumulative impacts must be weighed along
with the project's direct impacts.",8 7 In considering whether the
agency followed this procedural requirement, the court must first
181. MINN. STAT. § 116D.02. This language mirrors the language in NEPA that
originally was deemed to contain the substantive requirements; see supra note 8
and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
183. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1112, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
184. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
186. MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7.
187. GUIDE TO MINN. RuLES, supranote 19, at 5.
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ask whether the RGU considered cumulative impacts. If the EAW
entirely omitted a discussion of cumulative impacts or if the RGU's
consideration was "pro forma," then the RGU failed to follow the
regulation requiring analysis of cumulative impacts. If, on the
other hand, the EAW discussed cumulative impacts to a certain
extent, then the court must look to the actual content of the
cumulative impact analysis to determine its validity. At this point
the inquiry becomes substantive. While the overarching issue is
whether the agency followed procedure, the question has
transformed into a substantive review, and, as noted above, the
court should defer to the technical expertise of the agency,
reviewing only for arbitrariness or caprice. Thus, what began as a
procedural inquiry ends as a substantive one.
D. The Effect of SeparateProceduralReview
One might question whether separate procedural review is
even necessary if it ultimately ends in a substantive evaluation of
the RGU's decisionmaking. A distinct procedural review is critical
to a legally correct outcome. An analysis of the Iron Rangers and
Audubon decisions illustrate precisely why this separate standard is
so essential.
In Iron Rangers, the court misapplied Minnesota Supreme
Court precedent to sustain a technical judgment on the part of the
RGU.
The MCEA alleged that the Giants Ridge expansion would
cause substantial forest fragmentation. '" Although the DNR
presented some evidence demonstrating that forest fragmentation
would affect the habitat of one bird species,' 90 the court concluded
that because there was no data proving the existence of a migratory
population of
the bird in northern Minnesota, an EIS was
191
unnecessary.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals, holding that the RGU could
not be "compelled" to prepare on EIS on "speculative factors,"
drew on Reserve Mining for legal support. 92 The Iron Rangers court
188. See Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Resources,
531 N.W.2d 874,885 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
189. See id. at 881.
190. See id. at 878. It is unclear from the opinion whether that data was
somewhat inconclusive or incomplete; the opinion does indicate, however, that
the DNR had evidence demonstrating that their concerns were more than mere
speculation. See id. at 881-83.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 881; see supranote 108 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
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attributed to Reserve Mining the rule that "MEPA does not provide
absolute guarantees for environmental resources."' 93
Reserve
Mining, however, never declared such a rule. Instead, Reserve
Miningstated that neither NEPA nor MEPA required that proposed
projects guarantee "absolute safety," and, as such, a dam project's
alleged safety hazard based on speculative factors did not require
that the RGU consider alternative locations for the proposed
dam.194 This misuse of precedent resulted from the court's review
of the RGU's decision without regard for the applicable procedural
requirements governing agency action when there is insufficient
information to complete an EIS.195 Instead of declaring that an
EQB regulation explicitly directed agency action when there was
insufficient
information, the court affirmed a procedurally faulty
196
EAW.

The Iron Rangers court saw further justification for its holding
that the RGU should not be forced to prepare an EIS on
insufficient data by stating that neither NEPA nor MEPA require
that a negative declaration be based on the "best available scientific
methodology."'9' Equating best technology with insufficient data,
the court concluded that the scarce evidence meant "technical
disputes and uncertainties" existed.'98 The court cited Greenpeace
Action where the Ninth Circuit declined to require the best
scientific data to support a negative declaration, but insisted only
on "adequate data."
The concern in GreenpeaceAction was which
methodologies an agency must use to collect its data and whether
those methodologies were sophisticated enough to obtain reliable
z
data.90
The issues did not pertain to insufficient data but rather
which data was better.20 '
GreenpeaceAction helps in understanding that the issue in Iron
Rangers was not about the best science or technical disputes.
Instead, there was not enough information to make an informed
Reserve Miningby the Iron Rangers' court).

193. Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 881.
194. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 830 (Minn. 1997); see
supra note 108 and accompanying text.
195.

See Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 877.

196.
197.

See id. at 885.
Id. at 881; see supranote 110 and accompanying text.

198.
199.

SeeIron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 881.
See supra note 110.

200.

See Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 1351-52 (9th Cir.

1992).
201.

See id.
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decision, and the court itself stated as much: "The effects of current
forest management on [the barren strawberry] are unknown. In
view of this technical uncertainty, we must defer to the discretion of
the county. 2 02 In the court's view, insufficient information was
tantamount to a technical uncertainty (differing scientific
opinion), despite the presence of EQB regulations directing RGU
action when there is insufficient information.0 3
A separate procedural review in Iron Rangers would have
permitted the court to distinguish between substantive, technical
matters on the one hand, and procedural compliance on the other.
By recognizing a distinct standard of procedural review, the court
could have asked the threshold question of whether the agency's
action was without observance of procedure. Minnesota Rule
4410.1700 provides that if there is insufficient information, the
RGU shall either make a positive declaration of potential for
significant environmental impact and prepare an EIS or postpone
204
the decision for thirty days to obtain additional information.
Because the RGU did neither, the court was obligated to set aside
the RGU's negative declaration. In Iron Rangers, a substantive issue
never arose in the procedural analysis because the RGU failed to
follow the regulation on its face. As a result, it was unnecessary to
consider whether the RGU's negative declaration, from a
substantive standpoint, was arbitrary or capricious. In this sense,
the procedural review as a distinct analysis was especially crucial.
Without it, the court sustained a negative declaration that failed to
observe the necessary procedures.
Audubon represents a more poignant illustration of the
necessity of a distinct procedural review. In Audubon, the court of
appeals upheld an EAW that failed to consider any impacts specific
to the Potlatch expansion, which would result in the clearing of
approximately 7,600 acres of mature forest each year.:15 The court
concluded that because it was "questionable" whether an EIS would
provide information beyond that already found in the GEIS on
statewide timber harvesting, and because it might be difficult to
evaluate the environmental effects of timber harvesting in the fourcounty area, a negative declaration was not arbitrary or
202.
203.
204.
205.
N.W.2d

Iron Rangers,531 N.W.2d at 881.
See id.
MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 2a; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See National Audubon Soc'y v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 569
211, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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capricious. 2 6 This holding is the epitome of the court's incomplete
review of RGU compliance with MEPA procedure. An examination
of MEPA's statutory and regulatory requirements demonstrates why
this is so.
MEPA provides that "where there is potential for significant
environmental effects," an EIS must be prepared before any major
action may begin. °7 The statute also provides that the impacts of
the "the proposed action" shall be considered "in detail. 2 0 Based
on statutory language alone, it is clear that project-specific review is
necessary. MEPA does not except project-specific review if the
results of such a review are uncertain. Nor does it except projectspecific review because it might be difficult to assess a project's
impact. Instead, the statute clearly indicates that an agency must
209
On this basis
review that specific project's environmental effects.
alone, the RGU's failure to consider the four-county area and use
only the GEIS was procedurally inadequate and improper.
EQB regulations also require that an RGU analyze a specific
project's effects.
Detailed provisions outline the requisite
elements of the EAW2 and precisely what criteria the RGU shall
use to determine if the project might adversely affect the
212
In addition, EQB regulations specifically address
environment.
the role GEISs have in environmental review: "The fact that a
generic EIS is being prepared shall not preclude the undertaking
and completion of a specific project whose impacts are considered
in the generic EIS. ' 213 While information contained in a GEIS may
be used to assist in analyzing a project's impacts, the GEIS may not
214
be used as a substitute for specific review.
Yet the Audubon court improperly deferred to the RGU's
determination that clear-cutting 7,600 acres of mature forest each
year did not have any potential to significantly affect the
environment, a conclusion supported by no information peculiar
to the Potlatch expansion.
206.

The RGU failed altogether to

Id. at 218.

207. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (1998); see supra notes 20-22 and
accompanying text.
208. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a; see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
209. See MINN.STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a.
210. See GUIDE To MINN. RULES, supra note 19, at 1.
211.
See MINN. R. 4410.1200; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
212. See MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7.
213. Id. 4410.3800, subp. 9.
214. See supra notes 130 and 157 and accompanying text.
215. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 569
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consider the impacts particular to the four-county area because in
the RGU's opinion, a view that the Audubon court thought worthy
of deference, it was unclear what new information an EIS would
reveal. In one paragraph, without a single citation to support its
reasoning, the court summarily deferred to the RGU's decision,
which essentially determined that the regulations providing for
project-specific review were inapplicable to the Potlatch
216
expansion.
Yet EQB regulations specifically and explicitly
prohibit generic environmental review.
Had the court asked the distinct question of whether the
RGU's negative declaration was without observance of procedure,
the answer would have been an unqualified yes. Yet, the court did
not pursue this procedural inquiry; instead, it limited its review to
substantive issues.2 s Like Iron Rangers, the separate inquiry of
procedural compliance in Audubon never would have necessitated a
substantive review because the RGU failed to comply with the
procedures on their face. Thus, as Audubon illustrates, procedural
review is a decisive factor in determining the validity of agency
action.
The unfortunate precedential effect of Audubon is that future
projects may evade project-specific
• 219review if a GEIS exists relating
to the subject matter of a project.

While the GEIS is a tool to

N.W.2d 211, 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
216. See supra note 155-56 and accompanying text.
217. See GUIDE To MINN. RULES, supra note 19, at 1.
218. See Audubon, 569 N.W.2d at 211.
219. At the time of this writing, the Minnesota Center for Environmental
Advocacy commenced another suit against the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency-a sort of "Audubon If" that revisits many of the issues in Audubon. The
new suit, filed March 22, 2000, in Koochiching County District Court, involves a
proposed expansion of the Boise Cascade Corporation's integrated pulp and
paper mill in International Falls, Minnesota. See File No. 36-C3-00-173. Presently,
production at the mill results in the consumption of 600,000 cords each year; the
expansion would increase timber harvesting to 700,000 cords each year. MPCA,
acting as the RGU, issued a negative declaration on the project's potential for
significant environmental impact. As in Audubon, the MPCA relied on the GEIS
on statewide timber harvesting to support its negative declaration.
Before they filed suit, MCEA argued to the MPCA and the EQB that the
GElS could not be used as a basis for determining significant environmental effect
because, as the rules provide, the EQB must first determine that the GEIS is
adequate before an RGU may cite to the GEIS's findings in their project-specific
review. See MINN. RuLE 4410.3800, subp. 8. The EQB determined that a GElS
would be deemed "adequate" even when significant change in environmental
circumstances exists or substantial new information becomes available that has an
effect on the accuracy of the GEIS's findings only if the RGU could address those
changes or new information in the project-specific review. The plaintiffs contend
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better understand the state- or industry-wide effects of certain
actions such as timber harvesting or animal feedlots, it has become
an escape hatch for RGU's seeking to avoid the more intensive,
analytical EIS. 220 In sanctioning the use of a GEIS to determine a
project's potential for significant environmental effect, the Audubon
court undermined the force of MEPA, gutted the regulations
prohibiting the use of the GEIS as a substitute for project-specific
review, and weakened the GEIS as a viable method for developing
long-term environmental policies, strategies and goals.
V.

CONCLUSION

The strength of MEPA is found in the procedural obligations it
imposes on agencies when they assess the impact that projects for
which they have oversight will have on the natural environment.
The force of this statute, however, has been significantly weakened
by the Minnesota Court of Appeals and its failure to recognize
these procedures as requiring specific action on the part of the
agency. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has renounced its own
duty of meaningful judicial review by failing to distinguish between
deference to agency expertise on substantive decisions and full
agency compliance of statutory and regulatory procedural
requirements. As such, the procedural mandates found in MEPA
and its accompanying regulations are at best forgotten, and at worst
ignored.
in their complaint that there are significant changes and new relevant information
that the GEIS did not consider. They argue that the RGU acted arbitrarily when it
failed to evaluate the changes that have occurred and the new data that has
become available since the GElS was initially prepared (and, as such, the GElS is
inadequate and may not be a tool on which the RGU relies to evaluate
environmental impact). Because the GEIS is inadequate to serve as a basis for the
negative declaration, plaintiffs argue, the negative declaration was arbitrary and
capricious.
220. Environmental groups originally requested the GEIS on timber harvesting
and forest management as the groups were concerned that site- or project-specific
environmental review was not adequately addressing the impact that timber
harvesting had statewide and believed a GEIS could examine more globally the
effects of timber harvesting. See Audubon, 569 N.W.2d at 214. Ironically, the GEIS
ultimately hindered the environmental groups' objective of obtaining accurate
information that would prove useful for developing and implementing
environmental policies. Telephone Interview with Lisa A. Misher, Attorney,
Faegre & Benson, L.L.P. (Feb. 10, 2000); see also Telephone Interview with Jim
Erkel, Forest Project Director, Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy
(Mar. 2, 2000).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court should recognize that MAPA
governs the standard of review in MEPA cases.
Given the
procedural and substantive requirements of MEPA, MAPA provides
at least two standards that courts must use to review MEPA negative
declaration cases: whether the agency action was made upon
unlawful procedure and whether it was arbitrary or capricious.
Without a distinct analysis of whether the agency followed MEPA's
procedures, this important environmental legislation becomes only
a policy statement of good intentions. MEPA was meant to do
more. It was intended to create a process that would ensure
informed, well-reasoned, and responsible decisionmaking on those
activities that might jeopardize the health and welfare of not just
the natural environment, but of us all.
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